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Diffusion, Reinforcement, Geopolitics, and the 
Spread of War 
BENJAMIN A. MOST 
Brown University 
HARVEY STARR 
Indiana University 
The discussion reports the results of an examination of the possible diffusion of new war participa- 
tions during the 1946-65 era. A theoretical argument is developed to yield more precise expectations 
about when, where, why, and how diffusion processs might operate. Four diffusion-related processes 
(positive spatial diffusion, positive reinforcement, negative spatial diffusion, and negative reinforce- 
ment) are discussed and analyzed. A series of simple turnover tables and afocus on nations' borders 
are used to go beyond the authors' previous stochastic modeling efforts. The results provide strong 
evidence that is consistent with both the authors' theoretical argument and the general war diffusion 
hypothesis. The analyses seem to indicate that certain types of wars may indeed have tended to diffuse 
across space from one nation to another between 1946 and 1965. 
The notion that an event may alter the proba- 
bility of subsequent events through diffusion or 
contagion processes is not new. The work of 
scholars on a variety of topics suggests that wars 
may also diffuse.' As Rapoport (1960) observes, 
Support for this research has been provided by the 
Center for International Policy Studies, Indiana Univer- 
sity, under Grant 750-9514 from the Ford Foundation, 
and from an Indiana University Grant-in-Aid of Faculty 
Research. While a number of colleagues have been help- 
ful to us in this research, the authors would like to ex- 
tend a special word of gratitude to the late John V. Gil- 
lespie. His support, advice, ideas and criticisms were in- 
valuable. 
'Scholars such as Naroll (1961, 1965, 1973), Lieber- 
son and Silverman (1965), Walker (1969), Spilerman 
(1970), Midlarsky (1970, 1974a, 1978), Gillespie (1970), 
Gray (1973), Job (1973), Most (1973), Collier and Mes- 
sick (1975), Li and Thompson (1975), Siverson and 
Duncan (1976), Ross and Homer (1976), Eyestone 
(1977) and others have examined the diffusion of phe- 
nomenon such as race riots, coups and other types of 
domestic violence, alliance behaviors and policy innova- 
tions. The possibility that wars may similarly diffuse is 
suggested in research on the cyclical patterns in the 
onset of war and the amount of war that is underway in 
the system at any given point in time (Moyal, 1949; 
Wright, 1965; Denton, 1966; Denton and Phillips, 1968; 
and Singer and Small, 1972), the linkages between the 
international environment and foreign policy (Rosenau, 
1969, 1971; Wilkenfeld, 1973), the impact of external 
conditions on violence within nations (Stohl, 1975), the 
relationship between domestic violence and foreign 
policy actions (Wilkenfeld, 1968, 1969, 1972) and re- 
search on arms races (Richardson, 1960a; North, Brody 
and Holsti, 1964: Zinnes, 1976; and Alcock, 1972). 
1972). 
international conflicts may spread from one na- 
tion to another in patterns that are similar to those 
followed by contagious diseases. Participation in 
war at one point in time may affect the likelihood 
of subsequent war participations. The French 
retreat from Indochina, the Middle East and 
Africa as one after another of its colonial posses- 
sions erupted in wars of independence may be one 
example of such a process. The involvement of 
South Africa in Angola and the intervention of 
both Israel and Syria in the Lebanese Civil War 
may be others. 
Most of the analyses of the causes of war have 
ignored the theoretical and empirical evidence 
that at least some wars have significant conse- 
quences for subsequent conflicts. Only a small 
number of analysts have focused on the war dif- 
fusion possibility, and such work has failed to do 
more than scratch the surface of the problem.2 
2See, for example, Richardson (1960a, 1960b), Singer 
and Small (1974), Starr and Most (1976), Davis, Duncan 
and Siverson (1976, 1978), and Yamamoto and Bremer 
(1976). Richardson (1960b) investigated whether or not 
wars occurred randomly through time. Singer and Small 
(1974) probed whether the acceptance of war leads to 
more war, but their analysis focused on reinforcement 
patterns within nations rather than on diffusion from 
one nation to another. Siverson and Duncan (1977) used 
fairly sophisticated stochastic models to examine diffu- 
sion/reinforcement processes as they affected the tem- 
poral clusters of warring dyads drawn exclusively from 
the international wars included in the Correlates of War 
data set. These studies are similar to this article and our 
own earlier war diffusion research, but they are also suf- 
ficiently distinct from our work that comparative eval- 
uations are precluded. Differences in the data sets used. 
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The Argument 
The general war diffusion hypothesis concerns 
the possibility that the occurrence of one new war 
participation will alter the probability of subse- 
quent occurrences. It is helpful, however, to dis- 
aggregate this general hypothesis in order to dis- 
tinguish the four following diffusion-related pro- 
cesses: 
Positive Reinforcement: The process in which 
the occurrence of a new war participation in a 
nation increases the likelihood that the same 
nation will experience subsequent war partici- 
pations; 
Negative Reinforcement: The process in which 
the occurrence of a new war participation in a 
nation decreases the likelihood that the same 
nation will experience subsequent war partici- 
pations; 
Positive Spatial Diffusion: The process in 
which the occurrence of a new war participa- 
tion in a nation increases the likelihood that 
other nations will experience subsequent war 
participations; and, 
Negative Spatial Diffusion: The process in 
which the occurrence of a new war participa- 
tion in a nation decreases the likelihood that 
other nations will experience subsequent war 
participations. 
in the units of analysis examined, in the ways in which 
distinct phenomena are hypothesized to diffuse, and in 
basic questions and methodologies indicate that there is 
very little overlap with our discussion. 
That all four of these processes are related to 
the general war diffusion hypothesis should be 
clear. In each, a war experience at one point in 
time affects the probability of subsequent con- 
flicts. Positive reinforcement (see path A in Figure 
1) is a within-nation, temporal diffusion process. 
It is an historical possibility: A nation's decision 
to go to war at some time increases the probability 
that it will make a similar decision at some subse- 
quent time. Positive spatial diffusion (path B in 
Figure 1) more directly entails the transfer of one 
nation's war behavior to other nations. The two 
remaining possibilities-negative reinforcement 
(path C) and negative spatial diffusion (path D)- 
are somewhat more difficult to deal with because 
the researcher is placed in the awkward position 
of trying to analyze "events" that do not occur. It 
is, nevertheless, entirely plausible that such pro- 
cesses operate. Just as the toppling of the Allende 
government in Chile at least temporarily led Latin 
Americans in other nations to forestall coup ef- 
forts of their own, a nation's own war experiences 
or its interpretation of the war experiences of 
others may discourage a nation from going to 
war. 
Intra-Nation Reinforcement Processes 
Some initial assumptions can be made about 
the possible linkages between a nation's own war 
experiences at one time and some subsequent 
time: 
1. The decision makers in any nation are con- 
fronted by an "operational milieu" (Sprout 
and Sprout, 1965, p. 30) that comprises the 
risks and opportunities that effectively impinge 
on the nation in question; 
xito A. Positive Reinforcement Xit, > Xit2 
B. Poitv Saga egtve Spatial 
Diffusion \/Diffusion 
Ito It 1 C. Negative Reinforcement Xit2 
Source: Prepared by the authors. 
Key: X = War behavior of nations i and j, respectively, at times to, tj, and t2. 
Figure 1. Diffusion-Related Processes 
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2. The operational milieu (and hence, -the per- 
ceived risks and opportunities) may change 
through time, and such changes may induce 
decision makers to reassess their situations; 
3. If decision makers are to protect themselves 
from the risks or avail themselves of the oppor- 
tunities they perceive in their environment, 
they must possess both the capacity and the 
willingness to do so (Starr, 1978); and, 
4. Just as changes in decision makers' operational 
milieus may alter their perceptions of the risks 
and opportunities, changes in the perceived en- 
vironment may also result in changes in deci- 
sion makers' willingness to undertake particu- 
lar policies in response to the risks and oppor- 
tunities confronting them. 
The importance of these assumptions can be 
demonstrated by considering Boulding's "theory 
of viability" (1962, Ch. 4). Focusing on zones in 
which a nation is dominant ("unconditionally via- 
ble") and dominated ("conditionally viable"), 
Boulding argues that a nation will increase its de- 
fense expenditures in an effort to expand the first 
area and contract the second. Decisions to arm or 
disarm at one time thus have some effect on a na- 
tion's zones of unconditional and conditional via- 
bility at some later time. 
The point to be noted, of course, is that an ar- 
maments decision is only one factor that may alter 
a nation's zones of unconditional and conditional 
viability, and hence, its decision makers' percep- 
tions of risks and opportunities. Similar linkages 
can be posited to relate a nation's recent and fu- 
ture war behavior. Regardless of whether a nation 
wins or loses an initial conflict, the conflict may 
have some impact on that nation's viability zones. 
The fighting should induce the leaders of a war- 
ring (or a recently warring) nation to reassess 
risks, opportunities, and policy options. This re- 
evaluation may alter the probability that the na- 
tion will soon take up arms again. 
Losing a war, for example, may shift a nation 
from being unconditionally viable at its home to 
being only conditionally viable and may result in 
positive reinforcement. A defeat may frustrate a 
nation's leaders and encourage them to avenge the 
loss, recoup national pride, recover lost territory, 
and so on by waging a subsequent conflict (e.g., 
Germany's reaction to World War I and the Arab 
nations' reaction to successive Israeli victories in 
the Middle East). The shift from unconditional to 
conditional viability could also produce a negative 
reinforcement effect. An initial loss might de- 
crease the likelihood of subsequent wars by reduc- 
ing a nation's fighting capacity, increasing the na- 
tion's fear of war, or persuading leaders of the fu- 
tility of the war option (e.g., Japan since World 
War II). 
A victory which shifts a nation from being con- 
ditionally viable at its home to being uncondition- 
ally viable could produce similar results. In a pro- 
cess of positive reinforcement, success may em- 
bolden a nation's leaders-see Blainey's (1973) 
notions of "confidence" and "optimism"-and 
thereby stimulate their entry into subsequent con- 
flicts (e.g., Hitler at the outset of World War II or 
the Vietnamese and their decision to attack Kam- 
puchea). Alternatively, an initial victory may pro- 
duce negative reinforcement and decrease the like- 
lihood of subsequent wars if leaders are satiated 
or the nation's dominance over some territory is 
secured (e.g., wars of colonial conquest and na- 
tional expansion or integration). 
These scenarios could be extended, of course. 
The Vietnam defeat clearly did not shift the 
United States from a state of unconditional to 
conditional viability at its home, for example. 
Nevertheless, that conflict may have had a nega- 
tive reinforcement effect insofar as it apparently 
induced the U.S. to forego subsequent overt war 
participations in Angola and Ethiopia. Despite 
the relative simplicity of these scenarios, however, 
their point should be clear: Just as a nation's deci- 
sion to arm at one point in time may affect that 
nation's risks and opportunities and hence its ar- 
maments decisions at some subsequent time, 
fighting a war may have similar impacts. Be- 
cause a war at one time will alter the risks, oppor- 
tunities, and policy options facing decision 
makers, the likelihood that they will decide to be- 
come involved in another conflict may also be 
shifted. 
Inter-Nation Spatial Diffusion Processes 
The possible operation of intra-nation rein- 
forcement processes seems clear in comparison 
with inter-nation spatial diffusion effects. Even if 
a war participation by one nation alters the proba- 
bility that other nations will become involved in 
wars, it seems unreasonable to expect that a new 
war participation by Cambodia, for example, 
would have more than a negligible impact on Bo- 
livia's decision calculus. At a minimum, it seems 
more reasonable to hypothesize that if wars tend 
to diffuse, the process is most likely to operate 
among those nations that share high levels of in- 
teraction. In other words, it is plausible that spa- 
tial diffusion processes exist, but they may oper- 
ate only within those groups of nations that inter- 
act most strongly rather than at the global level. 
The difficulty, of course, is that nations interact 
with each other in different ways. Nevertheless, 
simple geographic proximity seems to constitute a 
very basic and at least initially useful basis for 
identifying those groups of interacting nations 
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within which diffusion processes are most likely. 
The importance of geographic proximity in deter- 
mining the amount of interaction between nations 
and how it may create awareness, risks and oppor- 
tunities have been discussed extensively by Zipf 
(1949), Richardson (1960a, p. 176), Gleditsch 
(1969), Gleditsch and Singer (1970), Weede (1970, 
1973, 1975), Cobb and Elder (1970, p. 89), Pear- 
son (1974), Starr (1975), and Garnham (1976). 
Nations that are "close" to one another in terms 
of distance are likely to interact and perceive each 
other's conditions and behaviors as important. 
Simple distance-and especially the commonly 
used distance between nation's capitals-may not 
be the most useful indicator of the interaction/ 
proximity concepts, however. As we have argued 
elsewhere (Most and Starr, 1975, 1976), it seems 
preferable to operationalize the concepts on the 
basis of shared borders. Nations possess both 
non-colonial frontiers (those that exist directly be- 
tween nations) and colonial borders (those that 
exist indirectly between nations as a result of their 
colonies or territorial possessions). Simple dis- 
tance measures and non-colonial borders seem 
roughly analogous. What the distance operation- 
alization overlooks, however, is the possibility 
that even distant nations may interact with one 
another as a result of their colonial or territorial 
extensions. More important, a nation that borders 
on a large number of other nations is faced with a 
potentially high risk that it may be threatened or 
attacked by at least some of its neighbors. At the 
same time, of course, nations bordering on many 
other nations are provided with numerous oppor- 
tunities for launching attacks of their own (Starr, 
1978). 
Two of the existing treatments of geographic 
proximity (as measured either by "short" distance 
or shared borders) are worthy of note. The first is 
Boulding's above-mentioned theory of viability 
(1962, Ch. 4). Boulding argues that the "power" 
of some entity is greatest at home and that the in- 
creases in the cost and time necessary to transport 
that power cause it to diminish along a "loss of 
strength gradient" (LSG) as the distance from 
home is increased. Each nation possesses some 
home strength in Boulding's formulation, and 
that strength is affected by the LSG. Hence, the 
LSGs of different nations overlap, thereby creat- 
ing the zones of unconditional and conditional 
viability. 
Arms races develop in Boulding's formulation 
because a nation that is unsatisfied either with the 
area in which it is dominant (its "sphere of influ- 
ence") or with the area in which it is dominated 
begins to increase its home strength by arming. 
This will expand that nation's zone of uncondi- 
tional viability, but at the same time it will expand 
the area in which neighboring nations are condi- 
tionally viable. In response, those proximate na- 
tions may also begin to arm in order to reduce 
their areas of uncertainty and risk. In contrast, 
distant nations would be less likely to perceive a 
threat in increasing armaments because any in- 
creases would be offset or reduced by distance. 
According to Boulding's key tenet, "the further 
the weaker," one would expect that proximate na- 
tions would be perceived as more threatening than 
distant ones. Nations possessing many neighbors 
are given many targets or opportunities to use 
their power without being greatly affected by dis- 
tance. At the same time, however, such nations 
are confronted with great risks and uncertainty 
because they must protect and defend themselves 
against many potential opponents. Nations with 
many close neighbors thus might seek to reduce 
their uncertainty by arming, by forming alliances, 
or by going to war. 
Midlarsky's investigation (1974b, 1975) of the 
role of uncertainty in the occurrence of war brings 
one to a similar conclusion by an alternative 
route. In a variation of the frustration-aggression 
theory of violence (1975, pp. 37-38), Midlarsky 
argues that nations desire to reduce uncertainty, 
but they may be constrained from doing so even 
when they have the necessary capabilities. Politi- 
cal violence is more probable when such a nation 
is constrained and uncertainty not only cannot be 
reduced but actually grows. As Midlarsky and 
others hypothesize, more bordering nations may 
create more uncertainty by reducing control over 
the environment and nations may go to war to re- 
duce uncertainty. 
One should be extremely cautious in consider- 
ing the relationship between borders and uncer- 
tainty. More borders may indeed contribute to in- 
creased interaction among nations, more oppor- 
tunities for possible attack, greater risks of attack, 
and heightened levels of uncertainty, but it is un- 
likely that borders cause wars in a deterministic 
sense. It is more plausible to expect that they may 
-probably in combination with other factors- 
create structures of risks and opportunities that 
constrain the range of possible inter-nation inter- 
actions and make certain types of conflictual be- 
havior more or less likely. 
The important point, however, is that each na- 
tion's structure of risks and opportunities is likely 
to be changed once a war is under way and these 
changes may be most dramatic for those nations 
which are proximate to the warring nations. Two 
nations may wage a war to reduce their own un- 
certainty, but the fact that they are reallocating 
and expending some of their "power" in the 
3For a more formal summary of Boulding's thesis by 
two geographers, see Cox and Agnew (1974). 
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fighting may alter their immediate neighbors' un- 
certainty, LSGs and zones of conditional and un- 
conditional viability. For example, if a nation 
shifts from conditional to unconditional viability 
as a result of a war between other nations, it may 
join the conflict or initiate a war of its own in a 
process of positive spatial diffusion. Negative spa- 
tial diffusion might also develop in such a situa- 
tion. Nations which would have gone to war in the 
prewar period may no longer need to do so if a 
war is initiated by other nations. 
Recapitulation 
In summary, we have the beginnings of an argu- 
ment that may explain when, where, why, and 
how new war participations at one point in time 
may alter the likelihood of subsequent occur- 
rences in either the same (reinforcement) or differ- 
ent (spatial diffusion) nations. The thesis is not 
deterministic. Factors affecting decision makers' 
willingness to avail themselves of opportunities 
are omitted. Other factors that might also be re- 
lated to war reinforcement and spatial diffusion 
patterns are not included. 
While the linkages are neither complete nor 
fully specified, the basic outlines of the argument 
should be apparent. As Boulding and Midlarsky 
suggest, borders do not cause wars but the more 
borders a nation has, 
1. the greater the number of risks and opportuni- 
ties that confront that nation; 
2. the greater the likelihood that that nation or its 
colonial or extra-territorial extensions will be 
only conditionally viable; and 
3. the greater the level of that nation's uncer- 
tainty. 
If nations are conditionally viable or have high 
levels of uncertainty, they should have a high like- 
lihood of: 
4. arming and becoming involved in arms races; 
and 
5. going to war. 
Regardless of why a "first war" is begun, how- 
ever, that initial conflict may change the world for 
its participants and their immediate neighbors. 
The warring (or recently warring) nations and the 
countries bordering them may find themselves 
confronted with changed levels of uncertainty and 
altered viability zones. Depending on the nature 
of those changes and on the willingness of the de- 
cision makers in each nation to avail themselves of 
the risks and opportunities presented by the al- 
tered situation, the shifts in levels of uncertainty 
and viability zones may induce these nations to: 
6. participate in wars that they had no intention 
of waging in the prewar context; or 
7. forego their participation in wars that they had 
intended to fight before the first conflict 
began. 
Recent events in Indochina may exemplify at 
least some of these effects. Having fought and 
eventually won wars against France and the U.S., 
the Vietnamese may have been encouraged or em- 
boldened-in what we call a reinforcement pro- 
cess-to attack Kampuchea. The effects of that 
war may have altered Chinese perceptions and 
been instrumental in inducing them-in a spatial 
diffusion process-to launch their own attack 
against Vietnam. 
While the empirical evidence and a new theo- 
retical rationale seem suficient for investigating 
the war diffusion possibility, a new attack on the 
problem is buttressed by a second set of consider- 
ations. Most analyses of the causes of war have ig- 
nored the diffusion/reinforcement possibility and 
assumed that each occurrence of war was inde- 
pendent of all other occurrences. Such an omis- 
sion may be significant. If strong diffusion/rein- 
forcement processes undermined the validity of 
the standard parametric statistical assumption of 
the independence of observations and such pro- 
cesses went unrecognized, then spurious correla- 
tions may have been obtained between systemic 
variables or national attributes, for example, and 
the amount of war (Naroll, 1965). The results of 
correlation and ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regression analyses may have been misinterpreted. 
The standard tests of significance may have been 
invalid. The sampling variances of the estimates 
may have been underestimated. The predictions 
obtained from OLS regressions may have been in- 
efficient (Johnston, 1972, p. 246). Simply, the 
development of theories about the causes of war 
may have been impeded as a result of strong (but 
unrecognized) diffusion/reinforcement processes. 
Wrong decisions may have been made about 
which variables to retain and which to exclude 
from subsequent analysis. 
For these theoretical and methodological rea- 
sons, a more thorough investigation of the diffu- 
sionlreinforcement argument seems warranted. 
The initial efforts to test certain aspects of that 
formulation are presented below. 
The Analyses 
Preliminary Findings. In a series of earlier studies, 
two stochastic models-a simple Poisson model 
of random or independent occurrences and a 
Modified Poisson with diffusion model-were 
used to focus on the possibility that reinforcement 
or spatial diffusion processes influenced nations' 
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participations in wars between 1946 and 1965 
(Most and Starr, 1976, 1977). Following a ration- 
ale for a comparative focus on three sets of war 
data and a discussion of the various advantages of 
each (Most and Starr, 1976), we drew data from: 
the Correlates of War (COW) project (Singer and 
Small, 1972, Ch. 2); a combined Wright and Rich- 
ardson (WR) list as presented by Singer and Small 
(1972, Ch. 5); and the list of 53 wars reported in 
SIPRI (1970, Table 4A. 1) for which there was at 
least some reported Richardson magnitude of 
deadliness. 
The conclusions drawn from those analyses 
were fairly straightforward. Application of the 
Poisson/Modified Poisson procedures to the 
COW new war participations during the 1946-65 
period yielded no evidence that such events had 
tended to diffuse. When identical procedures were 
applied to the SIPRI new war participations, how- 
ever, the evidence was consistent with the proposi- 
tion that such occurrences had tended to diffuse 
and that the nations that existed as of 1945 had 
had heterogeneous propensities to engage in such 
conflicts. Finally, tests on the WR data failed to 
provide clear conclusions either for or against the 
diffusion possibility. 
These findings were intriguing, if not entirely 
conclusive. That such divergent results could be 
obtained from different, commonly used data sets 
had clear implications for scholars interested in 
the causes of war. The time may have come to de- 
velop a consensus about just what constitutes 
such a conflict. Even though the three war data 
sets overlap to a certain extent and thereby pre- 
clude any firm conclusions, the preliminary 
analyses provided some support for the conten- 
tions that different types of war may exist and 
that the dominant type of war may have changed 
through time (Kende, 1971; Starr, 1976). Even 
when allowances were made for the differences in 
the nations' rates of proneness to events, pre- 
liminary studies suggested that different types of 
conflicts may have had different propensities to 
diffuse.' The most important result from the pilot 
analyses, however, was that the diffusion problem 
could not be simply ignored. The theoretical argu- 
ment was clearly not confirmed, but it was also 
quite clear that-under certain conditions-at 
least some war participations might not have been 
4The evidence is only preliminary, but it appears at 
this stage that large-scale interstate wars such as those 
tapped by the COW list did not tend to spread during 
the interval. In contrast, the evidence is consistent with 
the hypothesis that small-scale, guerrilla and colonial 
conflicts (such as those that dominate the SIPRI list) 
may have diffused quite readily. This is merely a work- 
ing hypothesis, however. 
mutually independent during the 1946-65 period. 
If the argument was not verified, it was not re- 
jected either. Further examination of the diffu- 
sion possibility seemed warranted. 
The new analyses reported here are not meant 
as an exhaustive test of the theoretical formula- 
tion; they simply focus on the more important 
facets of that argument. Once again taking a na- 
tion's new war participations during the 1946-65 
period as the objects of the analysis (as reported 
by the COW, WR, and SIPRI lists) the new stu- 
dies abandon the use of stochastic models and use 
two much simpler sets of procedures. 
A. Number of New War Participations at t1 
0 1 2 >3 
0 a b C d 
CU 
1 e f g h 
Y 2 i k 
"3 >3 m n o p 
z 
B. Number of New War Participations at tl 
0 1 2 >3 
CU 0 CR/NS PS PS PS 
.C. .. 
1 NR/NS CR PS/PR PS/PR 
4-A 
2 NR/NS NR/NS CR PS/PR 
0 
>3 NR/NS NS/NR NS/NR CR 
Source: Prepared by the authors. 
Key: CR = Constant Rate 
PS = Positive Spatial Diffusion 
PR = Positive Reinforcement 
NS = Negative Spatial Diffusion 
NR = Negative Reinforcement 
Figure 2. Turnover Tables: Expected Patterns under 
the Four Diffusion/Reinforcement Hypotheses 
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The Turnover Tables. Potentially valuable in- 
sights on the diffusion problem can be obtained 
by considering simple turnover tables or transition 
matrices (see Figure 2A). If a nation had no war 
experience in some interval and none in a second 
period, it would fall into cell "a." If a nation had 
two occurrences in the first period and none in the 
second, it would fall into cell "i," and so on. 
Using tables of this sort make it possible to de- 
velop expectations about where nations "should 
have fallen if" one or another of the four pro- 
cesses was operating. (A number of these expecta- 
tions, developed originally in Most (1973) and 
Most and Starr (1975, 1976), are shown in Figure 
2B and Table 1). There is some convergence in 
these expectations, of course, making it impossi- 
ble to distinguish completely between positive re- 
inforcement and positive spatial diffusion. Simi- 
lar problems will be encountered in handling the 
two negative alternatives. Even with these over- 
laps, however, the expectations are sufficiently 
distinct to permit at least a modest step toward 
distinguishing among the four processes. 
The application of these procedures begins with 
a comparison of new war participation experien- 
ces between ten- and five-year periods: 1946-55 
versus 1956-65, and 1956-60 versus 1961-65 (see 
Figures 3 and 4). (Figure 3 concerns only those na- 
tions that Singer and Small (1972) classed as mem- 
bers of the international system during the entire 
1946-65 interval. Figure 4 considers only those 
nations that were system members during the en- 
tire 1956-65 period.) 
The results of these simple turnover procedures 
are summarized in Table 2. Regarding the com- 
parison of the two ten-year periods (1946-55 ver- 
sus 1956-65), it is immediately apparent that the 
expectations for positive reinforcement and posi- 
tive spatial diffusion are generally not satisfied in 
any of the three data sets. Almost no signs of posi- 
tive reinforcement appear, and there is only weak 
evidence of positive spatial diffusion. The results 
obtained for the second positive spatial diffusion 
expectation should not be completely overlooked, 
however. Three points should be noted. First, the 
nations that are included in this set of ratios fall 
precisely in the areas in which the positive spatial 
diffusion and positive reinforcement arguments 
do not overlap (see Figure 2B). Of the two posi- 
tive possibilities, only positive spatial diffusion 
can account for the patterns observed. Second, 
these ratios are low-4.2 percent (2 of 47) for the 
COW data, 13.6 percent (6 or 44) for the WR 
data, and 22.0 percent (9 of 41 for SIPRI-and 
quite clearly do not strongly support the conclu- 
sion that at least the SIPRI new war participations 
tended to diffuse from one nation to another dur- 
ing the 1946-65 period. Nevertheless, the progres- 
sion from COW to WR to SIPRI in the magnitude 
of these ratios does once again suggest that SIPRI 
(rather than COW) new war participations were 
more- likely to diffuse. 
It should be emphasized, however, that neither 
the positive spatial diffusion nor the positive rein- 
forcement arguments provide an accurate descrip- 
tion of the overall patterns observed in the turn- 
over tables. It is difficult to determine whether 
negative spatial diffusion or negative reinforce- 
ment provides a better accounting for those pat- 
terns, although the negative spatial diffusion pos- 
sibility appears more likely. Leaving that con- 
sideration aside, however, the important point is 
that the Poisson/Modified Poisson procedures 
failed to tap such negative tendencies. This analy- 
sis indicates that nations that were at peace gen- 
erally tended to remain at peace. Nations that 
were at war in one period may have had higher 
rates of proneness to subsequent new war partici- 
pations, but they appear to have followed some 
natural "regression" toward (if not actually to) 
COW: 1956-65 
o 1 2 3 
O 45 2 
1946--55 1 15 2 1 
2 
3 1 
W-R: 1956-63 
o 1 2 3 4 5 
0 '38 6 
1 14 2 1 
1946-55 2 2 
3 1 1 
4 
51 1 
SIPRI: 1956-65 
o 1 2 3 4 5 
0 >32 9 
1 8-4 
1946-55 2 5 3 
3 1 
4 1 1 
5 1 
Source: Prepared by the authors. 
Figure 3. Turnovers in the Number of New War 
Participations, 1946-55 vs. 1956-65 
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COW: 1965-65 
0 1 
0 >79 1 
1956-60 1 6_ I 
W-R: 1961-63 
0 1 2 
0 '70 6 
1956-60 1 8 1 
2 2 
SIPRI: 1961-65 
0 1 2 3 
0 '59 12 1 
1 111\ 1 
1956-60 2 1 
31 
Source: Prepared by the authors. 
Figure 4. Turnovers in the Number of New War 
Participations, 1956-60 vs. 1961-65 
peace, becoming involved in fewer war participa- 
tions in subsequent intervals. 
Those findings generally hold up, moreover, 
when the 1956-60 period is contrasted with the 
1961-65 interval. The exception is the slight shift 
that may be observed in the SIPRI data set. Of the 
15 nations experiencing at least one SIPRI new 
war participation between 1956 and 1960, 12 (80.0 
percent) had fewer new war participations during 
the 1961-65 period. Hence, the negative trend is 
once again dominant, although to a lesser extent. 
At the same time, however, the positive spatial 
diffusion inequality is satisfied: The number of 
nations with no new war participations between 
1956 and 1960 is greater than those having none 
between 1961 and 1965. In addition, 18.0 percent 
(13 of 72) of those nations with no new war par- 
ticipations in the first interval had at least one 
such event in the second period. (Although that 
percentage is smaller than the comparable one ob- 
tained when the two ten-year periods were con- 
trasted, only 9 nations made the transition from 
peace to new war participations. The marked dif- 
ference between the number of nations that were 
initially at peace in the two SIPRI turnover tables 
is at least partially accounted for by the fact that 
the five-year period comparison permits an in- 
crease in the number of nations from 66 to 87.) 
In summary, while negative spatial diffusion or 
negative reinforcement tendencies may have influ- 
enced those nations with at least one new war par- 
ticipation between 1956 and 1960, a positive spa- 
tial diffusion effect may have operated on those 
nations that had no new war participations be- 
tween 1956 and 1960. 
These simple turnover table analyses have not 
demonstrated, of course, that any of the four pro- 
cesses actually did operate. When an expected 
pattern was not observed, as in the case of positive 
reinforcement, it is legitimate to conclude that the 
process in question did not operate. When expec- 
tations were satisfied, however, similar categorical 
statements cannot be made. Nevertheless, the ap- 
plication of even these simple approaches has 
shown that patterns that are consistent with initial 
assumptions of negative spatial diffusion, nega- 
tive reinforcement, and, to a lesser extent, positive 
spatial diffusion can be observed empirically. 
Such demonstrations are not unimportant. 
They weaken the Poisson/Modified Poisson con- 
clusion that at least the SIPRI new war participa- 
tions tended to diffuse quite readily from one na- 
tion to another, even though some evidence was 
consistent with the positive spatial diffusion hy- 
pothesis. These simple analyses provide insight in- 
to an area almost completely untapped by our 
preliminary studies; namely, that rather strong 
negative spatial diffusion and negative reinforce- 
ment processes may have discouraged nations 
from beginning new war participations.5 
One other point should be made. Both the Pois- 
son/Modified Poisson and turnover table analy- 
ses focus on possible diffusion phenomena where 
such processes are the least likely to operate. The 
results are therefore somewhat surprising. Both 
sets of procedures yield some evidence that is 
consistent with the hypothesis that the diffusion/ 
reinforcement processes were operating even at 
the global level where the theoretical argument 
predicted that the influence of those effects would 
not be particularly strong. 
Diffusion Among Sets of Interacting Nations. 
The theoretical formulation developed above sug- 
gests that diffusion/reinforcement processes 
should be most likely to operate-if indeed they 
operate at all-at a group level among those na- 
tions that share high levels of interaction. As we 
'At the same time, the applications of these turnover 
tables have provided at least a partial escape from two 
limitations of the Poisson/Modified Poisson approach. 
It has been shown, for example, that these analyses can 
yield results that are generally consistent over at least 
ten- and five-year periods of aggregation, and that they 
can be applied to focus on different numbers of nations. 
Moreover, these tests have shown that it is at least par- 
tially possible to distinguish among the four alternatives 
under consideration. 
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have argued, nations close to one another or shar- 
ing some common border should interact and 
demonstrate high levels of mutual awareness. If 
this is the case and if new war participations do ac- 
tually diffuse, then it seems reasonable to expect 
nations with a nation at war on their border at a 
given time will have a higher propensity to become 
involved in new war participations at some later 
time than those nations whose bordering nations 
are initially at peace. In other words, one would 
expect nations to catch "the war disease," to bor- 
row Alcock's (1972) phrase, if they border on a 
nation already stricken with the malaise. 
As a first step toward testing this border opera- 
tionalization of the general diffusion argument, 
we coded each nation in the international system 
for the number of borders it possessed in each 
year between 1945 and 1965. While details on 
Table 1. Diffusion/Reinforcement Hypotheses and Empirical Expectations 
Positive Reinforcement 
Expectation: The ratio between (a) the number of nations which participated in at least one war at to and 
which participated in a greater number of wars at t1 than at to and (b) the number of nations which 
participated in at least one war at to approaches 1.00. 
Rationale: If positive reinforcement is operative, then one would expect: 
That if a nation was involved in one or more wars at to, it will have been involved in even more wars at t1. 
Positive Spatial Diffusion 
Expectations: 
a. The number of nations not participating in any war at to > the number of nations not participating at 
tj; 
b. The ratio between (a) the number of nations which participated in zero wars at to and which 
participated in at least one war at t1 and (b) the number of nations which participated in zero wars at 
to approaches 1.00; and 
c. The ratio between (a) the number of nations which participated in a greater number of wars at t1 than 
at to and (b) the total number of nations approaches 1.00. 
Rationale: If positive spatial diffusion is operative, then one would expect: 
1. That if a nation was involved in one or more wars at to, it will have been involved in even more wars at 
tI;and, 
2. That even if a nation was not involved in any wars at to, it could still become involved in a war at tj. 
Negative Reinforcement 
Expectation: The proportion between (a) the number of nations which participated in at least one war at to 
and which participated in a smaller number of wars at t1 than at to and (b) the number of nations which 
participated in at least one war at to approaches 1.00. 
Rationale: If negative reinforcement is operative, then one would expect: 
That if a nation was involved in one or more wars at to, it will have been involved in fewer wars at t1. 
Negative Spatial Diffusion 
Expectations: 
a. The number of nations not participating in any war at to < the number of nations not participating in 
a war at tj; 
b. The ratio between (a) the number of nations which were not participating in any war at either to and 
t1 and (b) the number of nations not participating in any war at to approaches 1.00; and 
c. The ratio between (a) the number of nations which participated in at least one war at to and which 
participated in a smaller number of wars at t1 than at to plus those which participated in zero wars in 
both periods and (b) the number of nations approaches 1.00. 
Rationale: If negative spatial diffusion is operative, then one would expect: 
That whether a nation is at peace or at war at to, it will refrain from becoming involved in any (or as 
many) wars at tj. 
Source: Prepared by the authors. 
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these codings are available in Most and Starr 
(1975, 1976) and Starr and Most (1976, 1978), suf- 
fice it to say that they are based on a mutually ex- 
clusive and cumulative six-way classification 
scheme that taps the following types of interna- 
tional frontiers: 
1. Non-colonial borders (those that exist directly 
between two members of the international 
system): 
a. contiguous land borders 
b. 200-mile limit water borders 
c. proximity zone borders. 
2. Colonial borders (those that indirectly exist be- 
tween two members of the international system 
as a result of colonies or territorial posses- 
sions): 
a. contiguous land borders 
b. 200-mile limit water borders 
c. proximity zone borders. 
Additional yearly codings recorded each occasion 
in which any given nation shared some border 
with a second nation that was involved in a war. 
In this way, it was possible to calculate the total 
number of warring border nations that each na- 
tion had in each year between 1946 and 1965 and 
to construct simple contingency tables (see Figure 
5). 
Regarding the existence of a warring border na- 
tion as a "treatment" that nations either did or 
did not experience in any given year, this strategy 
permits a focus on the following implicit trans- 
itions:6 
1. From peace to peace with no border nations at 
war at to (all); 
2. From peace to at least one new war participa- 
tion with no border nations at war at to (a12); 
3. From peace to peace with at least one warring 
border nation at to (a2l); and 
4. From peace to at least one new war participa- 
tion with at least one warring border nation at 
to (a22). 
If the border operationalization of the positive 
spatial diffusion hypothesis holds, then two ex- 
pectations should be satisfied: 
6These exploratory analyses focus exclusively on na- 
tions that were at peace at to. Two considerations ug- 
gest the need for such a strategy. First, if a nation is 
already at war, that fact is likely to influence that na- 
tion's decision calculus more strongly than the simple 
existence of warring border nations. Second, a focus on 
those nations that were at peace at to permits an investi- 
gation of positive spatial diffusion in the only area in 
which the expectations from that hypothesis do not 
overlap with expectations from the positive reinforce- 
ment argument. Thus, a focus on those nations that 
were at peace at any given point in time serves to maxi- 
mize the likelihood that evidence of the warring border 
nation operationalization of the positive spatial diffu- 
sion hypothesis will be isolated. 
Table 2. Summary of Results Relating to the Four Diffusion/Reinforcement Hypotheses 
1946-55 vs. 1956-65 1956-60 vs. 1961-65 
COW W-R SIPRI COW W-R SIPRI 
% Ratio % Ratio % Ratio % Ratio % Ratio % Ratio 
Positive Reinforcement 
Expectation 5.3 1/19 4.5 1/22 4.0 1/25 0.0 0/7 0.0 0/11 6.7 1/15 
Positive Spatial Diffusion 
Expectation (a) No* - No - No - No - No - Yes - 
Expectation (b) 4.2 2/47 13.6 6/44 22.0 9/41 1.2 1/80 7.9 6/76 18.0 13/72 
Expectation (c) 4.5 3/66 10.6 7/66 15.2 10/66 1.1 1/87 6.9 6/87 16.1 14/87 
Negative Reinforcement 
Expectation 84.2 16/19 86.4 19/22 72.0 18/25 85.7 6/7 90.9 10/11 80.0 12/15 
Negative Spatial Diffusion 
Expectation (a) Yes* - Yes - Yes - Yes - Yes - No - 
Expectation (b) 95.7 45/47 86.4 38/44 78.0 32/41 98.8 79/80 92.1 70/76 81.9 59/72 
Expectation (c) 92.4 61/66 86.4 57/66 75.6 50/66 97.7 85/87 92.0 80/87 81.6 71/87 
Source: Prepared by the authors. 
Note: Calculations are based on the expectations shown in Table 1. 
*"Yes" and "No" entries denote whether or not the given expectation was or was not satisfied. 
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A. Number of New War Participations t1 to ts 
0 >1 
Number of Warring 0 al1 a12 
Border Nations to 
>1 2 a22 
B. Number of SIPRI New War Participations, 
1959-63 
0 >1 
Number of SIPRI 0 21 o 
Warring Border 
Nations, 1958 
>1 45 14 
Source: Prepared by the authors. 
Figure 5. Contingency Table Format, with an Example 
Using SIPRI Data (for All Nations at Peace at to) 
a22 > a12 
and 
(a22)I(a12 + a22) -p 1.00. 
In Table 3, the tests for these expectations are pre- 
sented for the COW, WR, and SIPRI data sets. 
The first column denotes the appropriate to for 
each test. The second column identifies the five- 
year period, subsequent to to, during which new 
war participations were aggregated. 
The results of these analyses show impressive 
evidence in support of the border operationaliza- 
tion of the positive spatial diffusion hypothesis. 
In the 43 five-year lags examined (15 each in COW 
and SIPRI; 13 in WR), the inequality is not satis- 
fied only twice. Overwhelmingly, for all three 
data sets, a22 > a12. In the same number of tests, 
the ratio dropped below .50 on only four occa- 
sions. (Of the two expectations delineated above, 
the ratio test is more likely not to be satisfied. The 
majority of the nations were always at peace. 
Hence, the implicit transition from peace to at 
least one new war participation under the condi- 
tion of 0 warring border nations could carry a low 
probability and still cause a number of nations to 
make that shift.) 
Perhaps the most useful summary of the test re- 
sults, however, are the following comparisons of 
the mean transition rates: 
COW: a22 = .1499 a12 = .0303 
(-22)1(W12) = 4.9472; 
WR: G22=.1558 a12=.0345 
(d22)/Ga12)= 4.5159; 
SIPRI: a22=.1855 al2-.0589 
(d_22)/GT12) = 3.149, 
where the COW a22 denotes the mean a22 obtained 
in the 15 five-year lag tests shown in Table 3, and 
so on. 
Even though a nation has at least one warring 
border nation at some point in time, it should be 
evident that that nation will not necessarily par- 
ticipate in at least one conflict during the subse- 
quent five-year period. Like lung cancer, wars are 
rare events. Nevertheless, just as in the relation- 
ship between smoking and cancer, having a war- 
ring border nation does increase the odds that a 
subsequent new war participation will occur 
within five years. On the SIPRI data set, those 
chances are increased over three times; on the WR 
data set, four and a half times; and on the COW 
data set, nearly five times. 
We have again asked the question: What would 
the world "look like" if there were positive spatial 
diffusion? This question could best be answered 
by focusing on a group of nations that could not 
also be involved in positive reinforcement, those 
nations that had not been at war at some given 
time. These nations were submitted to a "treat- 
ment" -the presence or absence of warring bor- 
der nations. The possible effects of this treatment 
are apparent. The presence of warring border na- 
tions may have increased a peaceful nation's pro- 
bability of going to war from three to five times. 
Conclusion 
The empirical findings may be readily summar- 
ized under the procedures used in this and our 
earlier analyses: 
The Poisson/Modified Poisson Approach: The ap- 
plication and subsequent testing of the Poisson 
and Modified Poisson models yielded no evidence 
that COW new war participations diffused from 
one nation to another between 1946 and 1965. 
When identical procedures were applied to the 
SIPRI new war participations, however, exactly 
the opposite findings were obtained: SIPRI new 
war participations apparently did diffuse from 
one nation to another during the 20-year period. 
Tests on the WR data failed to yield clear conclu- 
sions that diffusion processes were or were not 
operating. 
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Table 3. Tests of the Positive Spatial Diffusion/Warring Border Nation Hypothesis: 
Subsequent New War Participations for All Nations at Peace at Each Successive to 
Row Variable Colujnn Variable Ratio: 
(to) (t1 tots) al2 a22 a22/a12 +a22 
A. Results Based on COW Data 
1946 1947-51 .000 .364 100.0 
1947 1948-52 .128 .500 72.2 
1948 1949-53 .083 .393 78.6 
1949 1950-54 .103 .343 73.3 
1950 1951-55 .000 .098 100.0 
1951 1952-56 .000 .082 100.0 
1952 1953-57 .000 .078 100.0 
1953 1954-58 .000 .077 100.0 
1954 1955-59 .052 .130 50.0 
1955 1956-60 .063 .105 33.3 
1956 1957-61 .000 .000 0.0* 
1957 1958-62 .000 .027 100.0 
1958 1959-63 .000 .026 100.0 
1959 1960-64 .000 .026 100.0 
1960 1961-65 .025 .000 0.0* 
B. Results Based on WR Data 
1946 1947-51 .083 .313 93.8 
1947 1948-52 .000 .292 100.0 
1948 1949-53 .091 .196 90.0 
1949 1950-54 .000 .231 100.0 
1950 1951-55 .000 .020 100.0 
1951 1952-56 .000 .098 100.0 
1952 1953-57 .000 .094 100.0 
1953 1954-58 .000 .096 100.0 
1954 1955-59 .077 .128 62.5 
1955 1956-60 .071 .158 66.7 
1956 1957-61 .000 .118 100.0 
1957 1958-62 .065 .170 81.8 
1958 1959-63 .131 .185 38.5 
C. Results Based on SIPRI Data 
1946 1947-51 .176 .300 80.0 
1947 1948-52 .000 .209 100.0 
1948 1949-53 .100 .163 87.5 
1949 1950-54 .100 .217 90.9 
1950 1951-55 .100 .061 75.0 
1951 1952-56 .091 .167 88.9 
1952 1953-57 .000 .170 100.0 
1953 1954-58 .083 .200 90.9 
1954 1955-59 .063 .172 90.9 
1955 1956-60 .059 .180 91.7 
1956 1957-61 .000 .123 100.0 
1957 1958-62 .045 .172 90.9 
1958 1959-63 .000 .237 100.0 
1959 1960-64 .000 .186 100.0 
1960 1961-65 .067 .226 93.3 
Source: Prepared by the authors. 
*Zero New War Participations occurred in the lagged period. Such occurrences omitted from the error totals. 
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The Turnover Table Analyses: The turnover tables 
indicated that strong negative reinforcement and! 
or negative spatial diffusion processes may have 
influenced the subsequent war behavior of those 
nations that experienced at least one new war par- 
ticipation during the initial period. Although 
those tendencies dominated the results in all three 
data sets, they were strongest in the COW set and 
weakest in the SIPRI data. Some evidence to sup- 
port the hypothesis of positive spatial diffusion 
was also isolated. Although it was weak in com- 
parison with the above-mentioned negative ef- 
fects, the strength of the positive spatial diffusion 
appeared to increase as one moved from the COW 
to the WR to the SIPRI data sets. No evidence of 
positive reinforcement was found in any of the 
analyses. 
The Contingency Table Analyses of the Warring 
Border Nation Operationalization of the Positive 
Spatial Diffusion Hypothesis: These procedures 
yielded very strong evidence in support of the war- 
ring border nation/positive spatial diffusion hy- 
pothesis. While having a warring border nation 
clearly did not mean that a nation would neces- 
sarily have at least one new war participation in 
the subsequent five-year period, it certainly in- 
creased the probabilities that subsequent new war 
participations would occur. If the numbers of oc- 
casions in which the expectations were not satis- 
fied were used as an index, those results were 
strongest on the SIPRI data and weakest in the 
COW set. However, calculation and comparison 
of mean transition rates indicated that having a 
warring border nation increases the likelihood 
that a subsequent new war participation would 
occur over three times on the SIPRI set and nearly 
fived times on the COW data. 
Clearly, further effort is required to synthesize 
these findings. Different types of wars appear to 
have different propensities to diffuse, but further 
exploration of this problem will require the devel- 
opment of new data sets that make more precise 
distinctions between large- and small-scale con- 
flicts. It will be necessary to probe whether or not 
different types of borders tend to drive diffusion 
processes and whether or not major and minor 
power nations tend to react in similar ways to 
wars on their frontiers. It will be important to in- 
vestigate whether warring border nations have 
varying impacts on nations that are themselves at 
peace and war. Finally, it may be of interest to 
consider other, non-border-related operationali- 
zations of the general theoretical argument with a 
view toward exploring whether factors such as al- 
liance partnerships, trading unions, and linguistic 
affinities might also define sets of interacting na- 
tions within which diffusion processes might 
operate. 
In lieu of such additional work, however, our 
argument is generally supported by the existing re- 
sults. War participations during the 1946-65 per- 
iod do indeed seem to have altered nations' levels 
of uncertainty and their zones of unconditional 
and conditional viability. Much like arms races, 
wars appear to have caused leaders to reassess the 
situations confronting them. The evidence is con- 
sistent with the proposition that conlicts at one 
point in time affect leaders' decisions to partici- 
pate in or refrain from subsequent wars. The evi- 
dence is weakest in the global-level stochastic 
modeling analyses; as predicted, it is most appar- 
ent in the examination of diffusion processes 
among groups of bordering nations. With only 
one exception, however, the analyses yield results 
that are consistent with the argument. The occur- 
rence of a new war participation by one nation 
during the 1946-65 period did alter the probability 
that: (a) that same nation would experience subse- 
quent new war participations, and (b) other na- 
tions would experience subsequent new war par- 
ticipations. 
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